Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1986

Vernon S. Cheever v. Joseph A. Seethaler : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jackson Howard; Howard, Lewis & Petersen; attorney for respondent.
Kenneth F. Clarke; attorney for appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Cheever v. Seethaler, No. 860086.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/846

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

|
UTAH

BR&F

SBf'J0' "l"',u

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

XkODKb

.A-C
DOCJ.EV Ntf

VERIZON S. CHEEVER, MARTHA
T. CHEEVER, UTAH COUNTY
PACKING COMPANY, INC., and
COLES BROTHERS, TV-~
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
No.

20,362
<

8ioOCfzio-c>A

v.
JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, MYRA
K. SEETHALER, and SECURITY
TITLE AND ABSTRACT COMPANY,
Defends

.:> pendents.
RESPONDENTS

Appeal from Summary Judgment, November 30, 198i
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah Cority
Honorable David Sam, presiding.
JACKSON HOWARD
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
P.O. Box 778
Provo, Utah 84601
(801) 373-6345
Attorney for Respondents

KENNETH CLARKE
Box H
Provo, .:z&\
(801) 3715-29.*

At+-orr^ r

f

cr

-its

FILED
APR2 3 1S85
C-ierk, Supierns CcuiX, U-ah

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

VERNON S. CHEEVER, MARTHA
T. CHEEVER, UTAH COUNTY
PACKING COMPANY, INC., and
COLES BROTHERS, INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
No.

20,362

v.
JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, MYRA
K. SEETHALER, and SECURITY
TITLE AND ABSTRACT COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents,
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
Appeal from Summary Judgment, November 30, 1984
Fourth Judicial District Court in and for Utah County
Honorable David Sam, presiding.
JACKSON HOWARD
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
P.O. BOX 778
Provo, Utah 84601
(801) 373-6345
Attorney for Respondents

KENNETH CLARKE
Box H
Provo, Utah 84603
(801) 375-2911
Attorney for Appellants

TABLE OF CONTENTS
t

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

t

Ill

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS/NATURE OF CASE

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

10

ARGUMENT

11

Introduction

11

POINT I
APPELLANTS' BRIEF DOES NOT MEET THE STANDARDS
SET FORTH BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND APPELLANTS'
CASE, AS STATED, CANNOT PREVAIL UPON APPEAL. . . .

13

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT UTAH
COUNTY PACKING AND COLES BROTHERS, INC. WERE
NECESSARY AND INDISPENSIBLE PARTIES

15

POINT III
AS CONCEDED BY APPELLANTS, ANY ACTION BY UTAH
PACKING AND COLES BROTHERS, INC. WAS
POINTCOUNTY
IV
BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. .
CHEEVER, AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND GUARANTOR, HAD NO
STANDING TO BRING AN ACTION FOR RESCISSION WHEN
ANY ALLEGED DAMAGE WAS DONE TO UTAH COUNTY
PACKING/COLES BROTHERS, AND CHEEVER, AS PRESIDENT
OF UTAH COUNTY PACKING ELECTED TO SEEK DAMAGES,
AND THROUGH COMPROMISE, TO AFFIRM AND RATIFY
THE CONTRACT

20

23

POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN NOT REACHING
ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD IN THAT THE CORPORATIONS
WERE BARRED AND CHEEVER, AS AN INDIVIDUAL, COULD
NOT SEEK A REMEDY IN CONTRAST TO THAT SOUGHT AS
A CORPORATE OFFICER; IN ANY EVENT, WHERE A
GUARANTOR EXERCISING PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE AS
TO BUSINESS OPERATIONS INHERENT TO THE CONTRACT,
THE DOCTRINE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR APPLIES AND RELIANCE
UPON THE OPINIONS OF THE SELLER ARE UNJUSTIFIED

i

29

POINT VI
EVEN WERE CHEEVER PERMITTED TO BRING A SEPARATE
ACTION AS GUARANTOR, HIS ALLEGATION OF MISTAKE
AS TO THE TRUST DEED FAILED TO ESTABLISH A
SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR RESCISSION

35

POINT VII
RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES
BY REASON OF APPELLANTS' FRIVOLOUS APPEAL
CONCLUSION

38
39

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Anstott v. Osborne, 417 P.2d 291 (Okl. 1966)

31

Azrak v. Manufacturer's Trust Company, 120 N.Y.S.2d 855
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953)

36

Camp v. Murray. 680 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1984)

16

Duaan v. Jones. 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980)

17

Ettlinger v. National Surety Company, 221 N.Y. 467,
117 N.E. 945 (1917)
Financial Corporation of America v. Prudential Carbon
and Ribbon Company. 507 P.2d 1026 (Utah 1973)
First National Bank of Grand Junction v. Osborne.
2d. 392, 503 P.2d 440 (1972)

24

28

Hobbs v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad.
677 P. 2d 1128 (Utah 1984)
Hotel Riviera. Inc. v. Torres, 97 Nev. 399, 632 P.2d
1155 (1981)

28
Utah
19
14
36

Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d
659, 662 (1967)

31

Jollev v. Puregro Company. 94 Id. 702, 496 P.2d 939 (1972) .

29

Keene Corporation v. R. W. Taylor Steel Company.
594 P.2d 889 (Utah 1979)
Kent v. Murray. 680 P.2d 758, 759 (Utah 1984)

28
17

McKinny v. Oxnard Union Heights School District Board of
Trustee, 31 Cal.3d 79, 180 Cal. Rptr. 549,
642 P.2d 460 (1982)

29

Pinkis v. Network Cinema Corp.. 9 Wash. App. 337,
512 P.2d. 751 (1973)

24

Sanpete County Water Conservancy District v. Price
Water Users Association. Utah 652, P.2d 1302,
1306 (1982)

16

State v. Barlow. 107 Utah 292, 153 P.2d 647
(1944), appeal dismissedf 324, U.S. 829
(1945), regh. denied. 324 U.S. 891 (1945)

24

Thompson v. Smith. 620 P.2d 520, 523 (Utah 1980)

37

Tokarz v. Frontier Federal Savings & Loan.
iii

34 Wash. App. 446, 656 P.2d 1089 (1983)

30

Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061
(Utah 1981)

36

Vickers v. Chrysler Credit
S.E.2d 842 (1981)

24

Corp. , 158 Ga. App. 434, 280

Walcutt v. Clevite Corp., 13 N.Y. 2d 48, 191 N.E.2d
894 (1963)
Weil

Clothing Company
Cir. 1954)

v. Glasser,

213,

F.2d

296

24
(5th
34

Other Authority
38 Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty, § 127 (1968)

18

38 Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty, § 52 (1868)

23

37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit, § 231 (1968)

33

38 Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty § 56 (1983)

36

66 Am. Jur. 2d Reformation of Instrument, § 12 (1973)

...

37

Statutes
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-12-26 (1953 as amended)

20

Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

38

iv

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL
1.

Whether

or not appellants1

brief comports with the

standards of the Utah Supreme Court.
2.

Whether or not Utah County Packing and Coles Brothers

were necessary and indispensible parties to this action.
3.

Whether or not Utah County Packing and Coles Brothers

were barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
4.

Whether or not Cheever had standing as an individual

and guarantor to bring an action for rescission when any alleged
fraud or damage was done to the principal, Utah County Packing,
and Cheever, as president of Utah County Packing elected to
affirm and ratify the contract.
5.

Whether or not Cheever, if he had standing, could as a

guarantor with professional expertise inherent to the contract,
inspect the property and still claim reliance upon the opinions
of the seller.
6.

Were Cheever permitted standing, whether or not his

allegation of mistake as to the trust deed failed to establish a
sufficient basis for rescission.
7.

Whether respondents are entitled to attorney fees by

reason of appellants1 initiating a frivolous appeal.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

VERNON S. CHEEVER, MARTHA
T. CHEEVER, UTAH COUNTY
PACKING COMPANY, INC., and
COLES BROTHERS, INC.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
No.

20,362

v.
JOSEPH A. SEETHALER, MYRA
K. SEETHALER, and SECURITY
TITLE AND ABSTRACT COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF FACTS/NATURE OF CASE
This matter

arises

business in Provo, Utah.

out

of the

The business and equipment were owned

by Seethalers, a Utah corporation.
the business was

sale of a meat packing

The real property on which

located was owned

Myra Seethaler, husband and wife.

by Joseph

Seethaler and

In June of 1981, the real

property and all of the stock of Seethalers was purchased by Utah
County Packing Company and Coles Brothers, Inc., each of which
were also Utah corporations. (R. 13, 18).

As security for the

transaction, Vernon S. Cheever, the President

2

of Utah County

Packing Company, and Martha Cheever, his wife, executed a Trust
Deed in the amount of $371,750.00 secured by a Trust Deed on
their

residence.

(R. 28-31). (Appellant's

Brief

P.28-31).

Soon after the sale of the plant, Vernon Cheever notifed Joe
Sethaler and complained of the condition of the equipment sold.
(R. 691-96).

As president of Utah County Packing, Vernon Cheever

achieved a compromise with Seethaler in the price of the accounts
receivable
697-98).

to

off-set

the

equipment

failures

(R. 642-45,

Utah County Packing continued to operate the plant and

by so doing affirmed the contract for sale*
Utah

County

Packing

Company

and

Coles

Brothers,

Inc.,

defaulted on their obligations and Mr. and Mrs. Seethaler, the
beneficiaries under the Deed of Trust, proceeded to exercise
their remedies provided under the Trust Deed.
Notice of Default and a Notice of Sale.

There was issued a

(R. 32).

The Cheevers filed this action seeking an injunction against
the

sale

damages

of
and

their
other

residence,
relief

incurred in the transaction.

and

based

also

upon

(R. 8-17).

to allege fraud of two types.

affirmatively

fraud

alleged

sought
to have

The Complaint attempted

In the first cause of action,

which sought reformation of the Trust Deed, the Cheevers apparently claimed that their residence was to be security for the
transaction only to the extent of $25,000.00, and that Mr. and
3

Mrs. Seethaler were somehow responsible for that misunderstanding.

The second cause of action, which sought to enjoin the

sale, attempted to claim that Mr. and Mrs. Seethaler had fraudulently

misrepresented

the

quality

of

the

various

items

of

equipment used in the business and the earning power of the
business itself.

The original Complaint was filed June 28, 1983,

(R. 8-17).
On August 26, 1983, defendants moved the Court to dismiss
plaintiff's Complaint based upon the fact that plaintiffs did not
establish the necessary elements for a cause of action based upon
fraud and also on the grounds that the plaintiffs allegation of a
mutual mistake failed to provide a sufficient basis for the
recision of any contracts.

(R. 40).

After the submission of

briefs by both parties to the Court, the plaintiffs sought leave
of Court to file an Amended Complaint.

(R. 117) .

Based upon

stipulation of counsel, plaintiffs received permission from the
Court on January 30, 1984, to attempt to amend their Complaint
so as to adequately state a viable cause of action.

(R. 190).

Subsequently, the plaintiffs moved for a Partial Summary
Judgment regarding the Notice of Default as it related to the
Trust Deed. (R. 191). On February 14, 1984, the Court considered
plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and also considered defendants' Motion to Dismiss referred to above.
4

Pursuant

to the submission of briefs and oral argument, the Court ordered
that the plaintiffs' Complaint

be dismissed

based upon the

findings that the pleadings as did exist did not allege fraud or
mutual mistake with particularity
granted.

such that

relief

could be

The Court did, however, allow the plaintiff three days

to file a Second Amended Complaint.

(R. 239, 304). The plain-

tiffs did so file a Second Amended Complaint on February 17,
1984.

(R. 213).

dismiss

Subsequently, defendants moved once again to

plaintiffs' Second

Amended

Complaint

for plaintiffs'

failure to state a cause of action upon which relief could be
granted.

(R. 251).

Subsequent to the receipt of briefs and the opportunity for
oral arguments, the Court on March 30, 1984, granted the plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ruling that the Notice
of Default had not given proper notice to the trustors and thus
was not a sufficient Notice of Default pursuant to the Utah Code
Annotated.

(R. 388).

On March 26, 1984, counsel met with the Court in chambers
and

an

informal

discussion

was

held.

The

Court

considered

defendants' Motion to Dismiss plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint.

The Court

ruled

that defendants' Motion to Dismiss

was denied on the basis of the existence of an issue of fraud

5

that was properly pled.
denied.

All of the plaintiffs other motions were

(R. 393)•

On May 29, 1984, the case had been set for trial; however,
counsel held a conference

in chambers with the judge as to

pre-trial matters that defendants felt may be dispositive of the
case.

Defendant Seethaler made a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint

for failure to join Utah County Packing Company as a necessary
and indispensible party.

Because defendants1 motion, if granted,

would preclude the necessity of a trial, the Court ordered the
trial date stricken and allowed for the filing of briefs by both
parties on the issue of whether or not Utah County Packing
was a necessary and indispensible party.

(R. 473).

Oral arguments were scheduled for July 5, 1984, wherein the
Court, after the submission of lengthy briefs, heard the arguments of counsel, stated its inclination on the ruling, and took
the defendants1 motion under advisement.

(R. 601). On July 11,

1984, the Court contacted counsel by conference call and further
discussed defendants1 Motion to Dismiss.
the plaintiffs1

The Court ruled that

Second Amended Complaint be dismissed without

prejudice for failure to join the necessary and indispensible
party, Utah County Packing.

The Court did, however, rule that

the dismissal would not be effective for ten days in the event
that the plaintiff could once again file an Amended Complaint,
6

this time for the purpose of joining Utah County Packing.
July

19,

1984, plaintiffs

did

indeed

file

a

third

On

Amended

Complaint and added as plaintiffs, Utah County Packing (R. 516).
Defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Seethaler subsequently moved for
Summary Judgment on the grounds that the statute of limitations
had run as against the corporate plaintiffs, Utah County Packing
and Coles Brothers, Inc., and also that the individual plaintiffs
were estopped from electing a remedy contradictory to that which
they had elected as corporate officers of Utah County Packing.
(R. 580, 571).
The

plaintiffs

limitations

had

basically

run

as

to

conceded

the

that

corporate

the

statute

plaintiffs.

of

After

numerous memoranda and oral argument, the Trial Court granted
defendants Seethalers1 Motion for Summary Judgment ruling that
the

statute of

limitations had

run

on Utah

County

Packing;

however, the Court once again allowed the plaintiffs to file
further

briefs

as

it

related

to

the

liability

of

the

Seethalers. (R. 715) .
On October 1, 1984, the Court held a hearing to give the
plaintiffs the opportunity to present testimony to the Court and
allow the Court to ask questions of counsel with their clients
present.

An open discussion between Court, counsel and parties

then took place.

The plaintiff,
7

Cheever, was

sworn

in and

questioned by counsel.

The Court ruled that it would take the

matter under advisement.

Subsequently, the Court met in chambers

with counsel and indicated its inclination to grant the defendants Motion for Summary Judgment based upon the theory that
Cheever, as an individual, could not bring an action for fraud
against the Seethalers in a separate capacity as an individual
where he had affirmed the same transaction as a corporate officer
of Utah

County

Packing.

The Court

indicated

that

it would

reserve ruling and allow, once again, the plaintiffs to submit
legal authority in an opportunity to persuade the Court not to
grant defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment.
Again after the consideration of numerous memoranda and oral
argument, on November 5, 1984, the Court ruled that it found that
undisputed facts established that there were no facts known to
Utah

County

Packing,

the principal, that were not known by

Cheever, the surety.

The Court further ruled that all facts

which establish any alleged fraud were committed upon both the
principal, Utah County Packing, and the surety, Cheever.
Court

ruled

that

the

principal, Utah

County

Packing,

The
after

discovering all the facts upon which it now complained, had
ratified
seller

or affirmed the contract between the buyer and the
(Utah County Packing and Seethaler, Inc.).

The Court

further found that under the facts and circumstances, that any
8

facts which may establish any alleged fraud were known or should
have been known by all parties because the surety, Cheever, was
also

president

of Utah

County

Packing,

the

party

that had

ratified the contract between the buyer, Utah County Packing, and
the

seller,

Seethaler,

Inc.

The Court

then

found

that the

principal, Utah County Packing, having ratified the contract,
had thereby waived any claim for fraud and that that election was
binding on the surety.

The Court further found that the surety

who is and was the President of Utah County Packing was thereby
estopped from asserting any claim for an alleged fraud, having
made his election of remedies.
a basis for its decision.
plaintiffs1

Complaint

did

The Court cited Utah case law as

The Court further found that the
not

state

a

cause

of

action

for

fraud and that the defendant had admitted that any claim by Utah
County Packing is barred by the statute of limitations.
Court

then

granted

defendants

Motion

for

Summary

The

Judgment.

(R. 746, 747, 794-795).
Subsequently, through a rather unusual Motion, the plaintiff
objected to the Court's Ruling and Minute Entry.

The plaintiff

claimed

surprise regarding the issue of whether or not Utah

County

Packing

had

ratified

the

contract.

Notwithstanding

defendants1 opposition to the form of plaintiffs1 objection, the
Court once again granted leave to the plaintiffs to file a brief
9

and

supporting

affidavits

relative

to

the

question

raised.

(R. 787).
Subsequent to the submission of memoranda, the Court heard
oral argument on the matter on November 2, 1984.

(R. 793). On

December 5, 1984, the Court ruled that "matters presented by
additional

briefing

have

heretofore

been

considered

and

are

adequately covered in the Court's ruling dated November 5, 1984.
Accordingly the Court's ruling dated November 5, 1984, is deemed
final."

(R. 796).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

Utah County Packing, Inc. and Coles Brothers, Inc. entered
into an agreement with Seethaler, Inc. for the sale of a meat
packing plant from Seethalers.

Vernon Cheever, as President of

Utah County Packing inspected the plant and executed the agreement.

Cheever, as an individual, provided additional security

for the transaction and became a guarantor through signing an
unambiguous Trust Deed Note for $371,750.00.

Subsequently, Utah

County Packing, through Cheever, complained to Seethaler about
the condition of the equipment.

Seethaler adjusted the price of

the transaction and Utah County Packing continued doing business,
and in so doing affirmed the contract.
Vernon

Cheever

brought

an

rescind

the Trust

Deed and to allege fraud in the entire transaction.

The trial

10

action

to

court, after prolonged argument and briefing, correctly ruled
that Utah County Packing and Coles Brothers were necessary and
indispensible parties to the action in that there were no facts
known to Utah County Packing, the principal, that were not known
by Cheever, the surety and that any action based upon alleged
fraud belonged to the principal, who in this instance, chose to
affirm the contract.

Utah County Packing, having affirmed the

contract, had thus waived a claim for fraud, which election was
binding

upon

the

guarantor.

Vernon

Cheever

estopped from asserting any claim for fraud.

was

therefore

Because the statute

of limitations had run on the corporation, the Court correctly
granted the defendant Seethalers1 Motion for Summary Judgment.
ARGUMENT
Introduction
The Seethaler Corporation, a meat packing business, was sold
to Utah County Packing Company, also a corporation.

Prior to the

sale, Joseph Seethaler took Vernon Cheever, President of Utah
County Packing, on a tour of the plant facilities.

Mr. Cheever

was given the opportunity to see for himself and assess the
equipment

involved

in

obtained. (R. 697-698)
decided

that

it would

the

sale.

An

appraisal

was

also

After agreeing upon a price, the parties
be

necessary

for

additional security for the transaction.
11

Cheever

to

provide

Consequently, at the

closing, Cheever signed the documents as President of Utah County
Packing and also signed, with his wife, a Trust Deed and Trust
Deed Note offering their real estate as security.
the

Note,

clearly

$371,750.00.

set

forth

without

The amount of

ambiguity,

was

for

Mr. Cheever, formerly having done business as a

realtor, could not have misunderstood the terms of the simple
Trust Deed.

(R. 28-31).

Upon experiencing some difficulty with the machinery used at
the

meat

packing

plant,

Mr. Cheever

wrote

a

letter

to

Mr. Seethaler complaining of the equipment and sought damages in
the form of a compromise on the sale price.
tion, there did

indeed

occur

a settlement

After some negotiaof sorts between

Cheever, representing Utah County Packing and Seethaler in that
the price of the plant was reduced.

(R. 642-45, 697-98).

Utah County Packing continued operation, never seeking to
rescind the transaction.

Eventually, Utah County Packing could

not successfully operate the business and bankruptcy proceedings
ensued.

Seethaler, through Notice of Default, sought his remedy

based upon the Trust
Cheever,

as

an

Deed and Note.

individual,

brought

At that point, Vernon
this

action

to

attempt

to enjoin any foreclosure and to rescind the Trust Deed and Note,
claiming that he did not read the Trust Deed and claiming he was
defrauded in the sale.
12

After numerous procedural battles, Seethaler brought to the
Trial Court's attention the fact that the meat plant transaction
involved Utah County Packing and Coles Brothers, Inc., and that
Cheever, as an individual, merely provided additional security.
Furthermore, Utah County Packing and Cheever, as an officer of
the corporation,

had

affirmed

and ratified

the Contract and

received the benefits thereof, and Cheever, as an individual
could not bring an action for rescission, because the allegations
related to fraud in the sale, if true, were properly to be
brought by Utah County Packing.

If Cheever, as an individual,

had any allegations of fraud at all to assert, it could only be
fraud as to the signing of the Trust Deed which was wholly
unambiguous.

The Trial Court was never compelled to even reach

the questions of fact as to fraud allegations in the sale since
the only parties entitled to assert such fraud, were Utah County
Packing and Coles Brothers and they were barred by the statute of
limitations.
Notwithstanding appellant's brief, which gives a contrary
impression, this case upon appeal is conceptually and procedurally very simple.
POINT I
APPELLANTS' BRIEF DOES NOT MEET THE STANDARDS
SET FORTH BY THE UTAH SUPREME COURT AND APPELLANTS'
CASE, AS STATED, CANNOT PREVAIL UPON APPEAL.
13

Respondents respectfully submit that litigants filing briefs
with the Supreme Court of Utah are under a duty to inform the
Court of the facts, the nature of the proceeding below, the
issues, the relevant
record

and

to

do

law, to supply references to the trial

more

than

superficially

comply

with

the

sub-heading requirements.
Generally,

respondents

found

appellants1

brief

to

be

insufficient to adequately inform this Court of the nature of the
case, the actual disputes, and the rulings of the lower court.
Appellants1

arguments were unorganized, largely unsupported by

law and respondents had difficulty in succinctly and completely
addressing appellants' brief.
Specifically, appellants failed to set forth the pertinent
facts of the case.

Appellants merely listed six facts which it

attempted to prove before the lower court.

The entire "Statement

of the Case" was largely without reference to the trial record
except for the multiple exhibits attached.
The Utah Supreme Court has previously addressed the problems
which the structure of appellants1 brief presented.

In Hobbs

v. Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad, 677 P.2d 1128 (Utah
1984), the appellants therein apparently cited only those facts
which supported its claim to the exclusion of other material

14

facts supportive of the trial court's Decision.

The Supreme

Court ruled:
In his presentation on appeal, the plaintiff
has recited facts that support his claim of
error to the exclusion of those properly
admitted,
material,
and
supportive
of
the trial court's decision. Axiomatically,
we affirm the lower court in such event.
[Emphasis added].
Respondents respectfully

submit that the failure of the

appellant to clearly present its case to the Supreme Court, as
well as its failure to present the material facts upon which the
Trial

Court

relied,

and

the

failure

to cite to the record

constitute a situation wherein appellants' case as stated, is one
which cannot prevail upon appeal.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT UTAH
COUNTY PACKING AND COLES BROTHERS, INC. WERE
NECESSARY AND INDISPENSIBLE PARTIES.
As set forth above, the transaction in question upon appeal
is the sale of a meat packing plant by Seethaler Corporation to
Utah County Packing Company and Coles Brothers, Inc.

The lawsuit

was originally only initiated by Vernon Cheever, as an individual.

Respondents submit that there are at least two reasons for

Rule 19(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which require
the joinder of necessary parties:
Rules 19(a) and 17(a) both seek to protect
the same interests:
judicial economy and
15

fairness to the parties in litigation. The
purpose of Rule 19(a), "which requires the
joinder of indispensible parties as a
condition to suit, is to guard against the
entry of judgments which might prejudice the
rights of such parties in their absence.11
Sanpete County Water Conservancy District
v. Price Water Users Association, Utah 652,
P.2d 1302, 1306 (1982).
In addition, by
requiring joinder of necessary parties, Rule
19(a) protects the interest of parties who
are present by precluding multiple litigation
and contradictory claims over the same
subject matter as the original litigation. [Emphasis added].
Camp v. Murray. 680 P.2d 758, 760 (Utah 1984).
The Trial Court determined, by Order dated July 17, 1984,
(R. 514-15) that Utah County Packing Company was a necessary and
indispensable party to the action.

One of the basis for that

Ruling was that the cause of action for fraud, if any, belonged
to the corporation, and not to the individual plaintiffs.

A

second basis for that ruling is that if Utah County Packing were
not joined, Vernon Cheever could claim that the self-same acts by
the defendants constituted fraud against Vernon Cheever individually, but not against Vernon Cheever as President of Utah
County Packing Company.

This is precisely the type of "contra-

dictory claim" that Rule 19(a) was designed to prevent.
"The plaintiff in an action for fraud has the option to
elect to rescind the transaction and recover the purchase price
or

to

affirm

the

transaction
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and

recover

damages."

Dugan

v, Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980).
must make an election of remedies.

The defrauded party

Utah County Packing has

clearly elected to affirm the contract.

This is evidenced by the

failure of Utah County Packing Company to bring a timely action
for rescission, by the fact that Utah County Packing Company has
made several payments on the Contract, and by the letter written
to Joseph Seethaler.

(R. 691-695, 642-45, 697-98).

In addition to having elected to affirm the contract, Utah
County Packing Company has waived any claim it may have had for
damages.

This is evidenced by the accord and satisfaction which

was reached shortly after the sale (R. 642-45, 697-98), and by
failing to bring a timely action for damages.
Utah

County

Packing

Company

has, therefore,

elected

affirm the Contract and has waived any claim for damages.

to

Vernon

Cheever sought, however, a directly contradictory result, that of
rescission.

The result would clearly have been inequitable, and

Rule 19(a) prevents such a result.
Where

the

existing

plaintiff

has

failed

to

join

other

necessary plaintiffs, the entire case must be dismissed.

Kent

v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758, 759 (Utah 1984).
The entire transaction, except for the Trust Deed Note,
which Vernon Cheever signed personally and the Deed of Trust to
the subject property signed by Mr. and Mrs. Cheever, was between
17

the

corporations

Coles Brothers.

of

Seethalers

and

Utah

County

Packing

and

Assuming, arguendo, that the fraud allegations

made in plaintiffs1 Complaint were in fact made, they were not
made to Vernon Cheever in his capacity as guarantor, they were
made to the purchasers, Utah County Packing Company and Coles
Brothers, Inc., and neither of those parties made any claim
against

the

Seethalers

based

upon

fraud.

Vernon

Cheever,

therefore, as guarantor, cannot raise such an issue because he
does not stand in the position of the debtor.

The misconception

of the plaintiff, Cheever, in this case concerns the right of
subrogation.

This right of subrogation would place the guaran-

tors, Cheever, in the place of the creditor were he required to
pay off the debt of the debtor, Utah County Packing and Coles
Brothers, Inc.
position

of

There

the

is no right

debtor.

The

for him to stand

guarantors

right

in the

against

the

creditor is based entirely upon the terms of the agreement of the
guaranty

and

nothing

more.

38 Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty,

§ 127,

Page 1135 (1968).
The

law

does

impose

an

obligation

upon

the

creditor

(Seethalers), to do nothing that would impair the security which
has been taken for the debt.

The Courts have even gone so far as

to give the guarantor an independent right of action to force the
creditor to seek the security that has been given before relying
18

on the guaranty;

however,

guarantor

the

include

none

right

position of the debtor.

of

of

the rights

substituting

given

to the

himself

in the

There is absolutely no authority for the

guarantor to be subrogated to the position of the debtor and,
consequently, unless the debtor raises the appropriate issues,
the guarantor cannot.
This is not to say that the guarantor would not have a right
of action independently for fraud if he were induced to enter
into an agreement of guaranty based upon fraudulent misrepresentations to him.

However, that type of fraud would relate to

intrinsic fraud within the instrument.
fraud

affecting

the

guarantor

There must be independent

separate

and

apart

from

the

contention of fraud which the debtor could raise but does not.
For example, if the purported guarantor was imposed upon to sign
a paper which he never intended to sign or did not know his
signature was being affixed

to the loan guaranty

agreement,

there would be no contract, regardless of whether the lender was
a party to obtaining the signature or whether the lender was
negligent in not checking with the purported guarantor before
advancing the money to the borrower.

First National Bank of

Grand Junction v. Osborne, 28 Utah 2d. 392, 503 P.2d 440 (1972).
The Trial Court was correct
Packing

and

Coles

Brothers

were
19

in ruling that Utah County
necessary

and

indispensible

parties to this action in that the thrust of plaintiffs1 allegations were allegations concerning damages done to Utah County
Packing and not to Vernon Cheever as an individual, and in that
Vernon Cheever1s claims as an individual were contradictory to
his actions as a corporate officer of Utah County Packing.
POINT III
AS CONCEDED BY APPELLANTS, ANY ACTION BY UTAH
COUNTY PACKING AND COLES BROTHERS, INC. WAS BARRED
BY THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 (1953 as amended) provides for a
three-year statute of limitations for actions for relief on the
ground of fraud or mistake, and also provides that "the cause of
action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued until the
discovery by the agrieved party of the facts constituting the
fraud

or

mistake.11

The

corporation

Complaint on July 19, 1984.

plaintiffs

filed

their

The crucial issue with respect to

the statute of limitations is, therefore, whether they discovered
the facts, which are the basis for their claim before July 19,
1981.

The uncontroverted evidence in this matter establishes, as

a matter of law, that the corporate plaintiffs did discover the
facts upon which their claim is based before July 19, 1981, and
their causes of action are, therefore, barred.
As

is

evidenced

by

the Affidavit

of Joseph

Seethaler,

(R. 642-45, 697-98), on or before June 18, 1981, Mr. Cheever,
20

President of Utah County Packing, contacted Mr. Seethaler with
respect to certain alleged defects in equipment.

Mr. Seethaler

disputed that the equipment was defective, but agreed to make an
adjustment

of

approximately

$1,200.00

in

the

price

of

the

accounts receivables, which Utah County Packing was purchasing at
that time.

(R. 642-45, 697-98).

Subsequently,

on or about August

19, 1981, Utah County

Packing Company sent a letter to Mr. Seethaler detailing certain
alleged defects in the equipment.

Although the letter indicates

that some of the repairs were performed after July 19, 1981, the
letter clearly sets forth that all of the alleged defects were
known

or

should

have

been

known

prior

to

July

19, 1981.

(R. 691-96).
As set forth in the statute, the crucial part in this matter
is not when Mr. Cheever, as President of Utah County Packing
Company, decided that he had been defrauded, but rather it is
when he discovered the facts upon which he finally based his
conclusion.

The uncontroverted evidence in this matter clearly

indicates that he discovered the facts upon which his claim is
based prior to July

19, 1981, and the claim

is, therefore,

barred.
Coles Brothers, Inc. was a partner of Utah County Packing in
this transaction, and the knowledge which was gained by Utah
21

County

Packing

Brothers, Inc.

Company must,

therefore, be

imputed

to Coles

Further, the letter is signed by 0. Kent Coles,

who was the Vice-President and Director of Coles Brothers, Inc.
The Trial Court ruled that Utah County Packing Company was a
necessary and indispensible party to Cheevers' cause of action
for fraud.

Utah County Packing Companys' cause of action for

fraud was barred by the applicable statute of limitations and
Utah County Packing Company was, therefore, never effectively
joined in the action.

It thus followed that Cheevers' cause of

action for fraud had to be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure
to join a necessary and indispensible party.
Appellants1 claim in their brief that it is anomalous for
Seethalers to first claim that Utah County Packing must be joined
in the

action,

and

to then

claim that Utah

Company's action must be dismissed.
about this situation.

County

Packing

There is nothing anomalous

The only anomaly would be if the result

advocated by appellant were to be obtained.
As is evidenced by the Affidavit of Vernon Cheever, dated
August 24, 1984, (R. 697-98), Utah County Packing Company compromised

all

claims

Mr. Seethaler.

it

had

for

defective

equipment

against

Further, Utah County Packing continued to operate

the business after it knew or should have known of any fraud on
the part of Mr. Seethaler, and thereby waived any claim for fraud
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and accepted and ratified the Contract.

Finally, Utah County

Packing has also waived its claims for fraud by failure to assert
them within the applicable limitations.
Where Utah County Packing Company has accepted the benefits
of the transaction and has waived any claims it may have had for
fraud, it would certainly be anomalous

for Mr. Cheever, the

President of Utah County Packing Company, to now come in and
assert a contrary position.
POINT IV
CHEEVER, AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND GUARANTOR, HAD NO
STANDING TO BRING AN ACTION FOR RESCISSION WHEN ANY
ALLEGED DAMAGE WAS DONE TO UTAH COUNTY PACKING/COLES
BROTHERS AND CHEEVER, AS PRESIDENT OF UTAH COUNTY
PACKING ELECTED TO SEEK DAMAGES, AND THROUGH
COMPROMISE TO AFFIRM AND RATIFY THE CONTRACT.
At the risk of redundancy, respondents respectfully submit
that Vernon Cheever was without standing to bring the cause of
action as a personal guarantor of the purchase agreement.

With

regard to defenses available to the guarcintor in determining the
validity

of the guaranty agreement, 38 Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty,

§ 52 (1968), is instructive:
If the principal obligation is not void
. . . but is merely unenforceable against the
debtor because of some matter of defense
which is personal to the debtor, the guarantor may not successfully set up this matter
to defeat an action by the creditor or
obligee seeking to hold the guarantor liable
on the contract of guaranty. Accordingly,
the guarantor may not successfully defend
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an action brought on the contract of guaranty
on the basis that the principal obligation was obtained through fraud practiced on
the debtor. . .
See also Vickers v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 158 Ga. App. 434, 280
S.E.2d 842 (1981) (a guarantor may assert all defenses, with the
exception of personal defenses available to the principal).
A claim that entry into contract was induced by fraud makes
the

contract

voidable,

not

void.

Pinkis

v. Network

Cinema

Corp., 9 Wash. App. 337, 512 P.2d. 751 (1973); see also State
v. Barlow, 107 Utah 292, 153 P.2d 647 (1944), appeal dismissed.
324 U.S. 829, (1945), rehq. denied, 324 U.S. 891 (1945).
The decision of how to proceed upon avoidable or unenforceable contract must necessarily be preserved to the principal
rather

than

the guarantor.

The

Court's holding

in Walcutt

v. Clevite Corp. , 13 N.Y. 2d 48, 191 N.E.2d 894 (1963), establishes that a guarantor may not take upon himself the election of
remedies which rightfully belong solely to the principal.

The

Court reasoned that by allowing the guarantor to interpose his
principals' defense of fraud, the principal would effectively be
deprived of his independent right to affirm or disaffirm the
contract.

This view has been recognized as early as 1917 in the

case of Ettlinger v. National Surety Company, 221 N.Y. 467, 117
N.E. 945 (1917), wherein the Court stated:
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[W]hat shall be done with the contract
induced by fraud is purely a question for the
determination of the party on whom the fraud
is committed. He may repudiate it, and if he
does so the surety may avail himself of the
repudiation . . . He may affirm it, in which
case the surety cannot be heard to raise the
question. He may suspend his action at least
for a time, and the surety may not compel him
to elect.
117 N.E. at 946.
The Court also adopted the following language:
If the principal could abide by his contract,
and the surety repudiate it, the strange
result would be produced, that the principal
would retain the fruits of its contract,
while the surety would avoid the performance of his obligation, on the ground of its
validity, in direct opposition to the acts of
its principal, admitting that the contract
was valid.
In the present case, Cheever, as an individual, attempted to
affirmatively utilize the defense of fraud in an action to reform
a guaranty agreement when the creditors had filed no cause of
action either against the principal or the guarantor.

To allow

the Cheevers affirmative use of this defense could not only
deprive Utah County Packing Company and Coles Brothers, Inc. of
their rights to elect affirmance or disaffirmance of the purchase
agreement, but also subjects, the Seethalers, to multiple suits,
undue

burden

and

hardship.

Judicial

economy

dictates

disputes be resolved in an orderly and efficient manner.

that
The

rights of subrogation available to the guarantor in the event of
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the principals1
plaintiffs1

default affords sufficient protection to the

interest.

More importantly, however, is the fact

that the actions sought by the Cheevers is in direct opposition
to the choice of remedies elected by Utah County Packing.
Below, plaintiffs argued that if Utah County Packing had
compromised

its claims it cannot maintain

however, was the very reason for the rule.
not be
claims.

subjected

to multiple

and

an action.

That,

The defendants should

contradictory

actions and

Vernon Cheever's only right of action is by right of

subrogation against Utah County Packing and Coles Brothers, Inc.
Appellants would persuade the Court that when the alleged
misrepresentations were made Mr. Cheevers was acting as both
president of Utah

County

Packing Company

guarantor of the guaranty

agreement.

and as a personal

In one of plaintiff's

documents submitted to the Court below, its response to defendant's Trial Memorandum, (R. 474), the plaintiff set forth that
Utah Packing Company compromised its claims of misrepresentations, yet, the plaintiff referred to an Affidavit as evidence of
no

such

compromise

by

Vernon

Cheever,

individually.

Such

reasoning is inconsistent and supports the defendant's positions
that any representations were, in fact, made to the plaintiff,
Vernon Cheever, while he was wearing the hat of the company
president.

Thus, two situations came before the Court, either
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Vernon Cheever acted both as president of Utah Packing Company
and as personal guarantor throughout the negotiations, or Vernon
Cheever acted as president of Utah County Packing Company during
the negotiations and subsequently signed the guaranty under his
capacity as a personal guarantor.
Under the first situation, any compromise and settlement of
Utah Packing Company claims of misrepresentation act as a merger
of and bar of claims of Utah Packing Company, as well as Vernon
Cheever, individually, as personal guarantor.

Similarly, under

the second situation, any representations were made exclusively
to the president of Utah Packing Company, and the plaintiffs, as
guarantors, are without standing to assert the claims or defenses
of Utah Packing Company.
Either situation supports the respondent's position that
plaintiffs are without standing the bring the action.
As set forth in arguments above, the only action that a
guarantor might have independently for fraud, would be if he were
induced

to

enter

into

an

agreement

fraudulent misrepresentations to him.

of

guaranty

based

upon

It must be an indepen-

dent fraud affecting the guarantor separately and apart from the
contention of fraud which the debtor could raise but does not.
There is a dearth of authority for the proposition since it
is so fundamental that no court has had to rule upon the subject;
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however, there are now analogous cases.

For example, in a suit

wherein a seller of steel sought to recover from buyer's trade
account guarantors, in the absence of any evidence the buyer's
contract and purchase from the seller were inherently illegal or
that enforcing collection of the purchase price for the product
would be invoking the powers of the Court to aid in unlawful
activity, the trial Court properly rejected the trade account
guarantor's
seller.

defense

of

alleged

anti-trust violations by the

See Keene Corporation v. R. W. Taylor Steel Company, 594

P.2d 889 (Utah 1979) .
In Financial Corporation of America v. Prudential Carbon and
Ribbon Company, 507 P.2d 1026 (Utah 1973).

The point of the

Court's decision in this case is that Wilkerson, the guarantor,
could not raise a defense that had vested in the debtor.

Fraud

is a defense to the debtor and may be pleaded affirmatively;
however, it is nothing more than a defense and may be waived.
Since the debtor does not take advantage of the claim of fraud,
the guarantor cannot
The fallacy of appellant's position in this case is that the
debtor may or may not have been injured or damaged by reason of
the alleged fraud and the debtor may have reasons of its own why
it did not raise fraud as a defense, and it does not behove this
Court in this instance to substitute itself into what it presumes
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to be the position of the debtor, and of course, the guarantor
cannot bootstrap himself into the position of the debtor.
The defects set forth above, that the plaintiffs have no
standing

to complain

of any

fraud

that they

claim

to have

occurred in the transaction between Seethalers, Inc., and Utah
County Packing Company and Coles Brothers, Inc., and that the
plaintiffs have failed to join parties necessary to this action,
are jurisdictional defects that cannot be waived.

As stated by

the California Supreme Court in McKinny v. Oxnard Union Heights
School

District

Board

of

Trusteef
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Cal.3d

79,

180

Cal. Rptr. 549, 642 P.2d 460 (1982):
Defendants contend that plaintiffs do not
have standing to maintain this action
. . . it is elementary that a plaintiff who
lacks standing cannot state a valid cause of
action; therefore, a contention based upon a
plaintiff's lack of standing cannot be waived
. . . and may be raised at any time in the
proceeding.
642 P.2d at 465.

The rule is the same where the plaintiff has

failed to join the necessary and indispensable party.
v. Puregro Company, 94 Id. 702, 496 P.2d 939 (1972).
POINT V
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN NOT REACHING
ALLEGATIONS OF FRAUD IN THAT THE CORPORATIONS
WERE BARRED AND CHEEVER, AS AN INDIVIDUAL, COULD
NOT SEEK A REMEDY IN CONTRAST TO THAT SOUGHT
AS A CORPORATE OFFICER; IN ANY EVENT, WHERE
A GUARANTOR EXERCISING PROFESSIONAL EXPERTISE
AS TO BUSINESS OPERATIONS INHERENT TO THE
29

Jollev

CONTRACT, INSPECTS PROPERTY PRIOR TO THE CONTRACT,
THE DOCTRINE OF CAVEAT EMPTOR APPLIES AND RELIANCE
UPON THE OPINIONS OF THE SELLER ARE UNJUSTIFIED.
Assuming, arguendo, that the defendant, in his statements
and opinions regarding the meat packing plant, had misrepresented
its value, plaintiff's reliance thereon would still be unjustified.

It is axiomatic that an element of fraud that must be

proven is that a party acted reasonably when relying upon a
representation

and

took

reasonable

steps

to

inform

himself

and to protect his own interest.
It must be noted, that Mr. Cheever, as well as Mr. Coles,
were experienced in the real estate business as evidenced by each
having a realty sales and brokers license.

The case of Tokarz

v. Frontier Federal Savings & Loan, 34 Wash. App. 446, 656 P.2d
1089 (1983) sets forth the applicable law:
A party cannot be permitted to say he was
taken advantage of, if he had the means of
acquiring the information, or if, because of
his business experience or his prior dealings
with the other party, he should have acquired
further information before he acted.
656 P. 2d at 1094.

It should also be noted that Mr. Cheever

eagerly pursued the purchase involved and based on the experience
of over two decades in the meat packing industry.
The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is required
to use his senses, and cannot recover if he blindly relies upon a
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misrepresentation, the falsity of which would be patent to him
if he had utilized his opportunity to make a cursory examination
or investigation.

The rule has been clearly stated as follows:

Where the means of knowledge are at hand and
equally available to both parties, and the
subject of the purchase is alike open to
their inspection, if the purchaser does not
avail himself of these means and opportunities, he will not be heard to say that he has
been deceived by the vendor's misrepresentations.
If, having eyes, he will not see
matters directly before them, where no
concealment is made or attempted, he will not
be entitled to favorable consideration when
he complains that he has suffered from his
own voluntary blindness and been mislead by
over-confidence of another.
Anstott v. Osborne, 417 P.2d 291 (Okl. 1966).

Similarly, the

Utah Supreme Court has stated as follows:
The one who complains of being injured by
such a false representation cannot heedlessly
accept as true whatever is told him, but has
the duty of exercising such degree of care to
protect his own interest as would be experienced by an ordinary, reasonable and prudent
person under the circumstances; and if he
fails to do so, is precluded from holding
someone else of the consequences of his own
neglect.
Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659, 662
(1967) .
In the present action, Mr. Cheever, as well as his business
partners,
regularly.

financial

advisers

and

family

visited

the

plant

The employees at the meat packing plant were very
31

familiar with the visitors and knew many by name. Mr. Cheever,
experienced in the trade of meat processing, was familiar with
all of its operations, including the equipment, and was aware of
the used nature of the equipment which was to be purchased.
Skilled in the use of such equipment, Mr. Cheever knew of a
constant need to maintain and repair used equipment.

In fact,

during such inspections, it would not be uncommon to observe the
maintenance, repair and cleaning process inherent in the trade.
Mr. Cheever had the duty to act reasonably and exercise due
diligence
deceived

in taking

the necessary

by those with whom he

Mr. Cheever!s
it would be

experience
improper

as

a

precautions

is bargaining.
licensed

real

for the Court disregard

against being
In view of
estate

agent,

such peculiar

intelligence and relieve such a party from the adverse effects of
his freely bargained-for contract.
There is no fraud where a vendor acts upon his own judgment
rather than upon the representations made by the purchaser.
doctrine has received

This

approval by a substantial majority of

courts:
[A]s a general rule, a purchaser making his
own investigations, either in person or by
his agent, which the vendor does not prevent
from being as thorough as the vendee chooses
to make them, cannot afterward allege that he
relied upon the vendor's misrepresentation
. . . If a purchaser makes a personal
investigation which is free and unhampered
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and the conditions are such that he must
obtain the information that he desires, he is
presumed to rely upon his own investigation
rather than on representations made to him by
his vendor. A purchaser of real property
must be regarded as having relied upon his
own judgment and not upon the representations
of the vendor as to the value of the premises.
So where, before entering into a
contract . . . the purchaser or his agent
makes an actual examination of the premises,
it is held generally that such purchaser is
precluded from having the contract rescinded
upon
the
ground
of
falsity
of
representations.
Where the buyer of personal property not only
has an opportunity to ascertain the truth or
falsity of the sellers representation with
respect thereto, but instead of relying upon
the representations, also actually makes or
undertakes an investigation regarding them,
it is generally held that he cannot avail
himself with misrepresentations on the part
of the seller, regardless of the result of
the inquiry, if the seller does nothing
to impede or frustrate the investigation.
37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and Deceit, § 231 (1968) .
Mr. Seethaler in no way restricted Mr. Cheever's access to
the premises; indeed the plaintiff was allowed to have access to
any and all information pertaining to the business.

An indepen-

dent appraisal, performed at the request of Mr. Seethaler and is
shown to the plaintiff, further evidences the plaintiff's free
and unhindered access to the property.

(R. 697-98).

The doctrine or maxim "caveat emptor" expresses a general
principle of law, both as to real and personal property.

This

doctrine means merely that they buyer of one acquiring property
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through a business or commercial transaction must rely upon his
own expertise in the purchase of such property.

At present, the

doctrine "caveat emptor" may be deemed to apply where the parties
deal at arms length and the buyer investigates or inspects the
subject the matter or has a full opportunity to do so.

In Weil

Clothing Company v. Glasser, 213, F.2d 296 (5th Cir. 1954), the
Court held that the maxim of "caveat emptor" applies whenever a
purchaser has full opportunity to inspect what he is buying but
fails to do so and relies upon mere statements of the seller
which amount to know more than "puffing," "boasting," or the
expressing of an opinion.
Respondent contends that the trial court was correct in not
even reaching the allegations of fraud in that the only parties
who could allege fraud were the corporations and such were barred
by the statute of limitations.

The Trial Court was further

correct that Cheever, as an individual, could not seek a remedy
in contrast to that sought as a corporate officer.

Furthermore,

even if Cheever were allowed to bring an action in fraud as an
individual, he was in the position to make his own judgment and
his failure to rely on any of the alleged expressions of opinion
of the seller were his risk assumed knowingly.
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POINT VI
EVEN WERE CHEEVER PERMITTED TO BRING A
SEPARATE ACTION AS GUARANTOR, HIS ALLEGATION OF
MISTAKE AS TO THE TRUST DEED FAILED TO ESTABLISH
A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR RESCISSION.
Appellant contends that Vernon Cheever, in signing the Trust
Deed and Trust Deed Note as guarantor failed to read the document
and

did

not

realize

that

he

was

securing

the

amount

of

$371,750.00.
A mere glance through the pertinent document would indicate
to anyone, uneducated or not in real estate, that they were
securing

the

amount

of

$371,750.00.

Mr. Cheever's

claim of

ignorance is even more incredible in view of the fact that he
was a licensed realtor.
It is well recognized that a guarantor's failure to read or
understand a document he signed is not sufficient grounds for
invalidation.
[W]hen the guarantor seeks to avoid liability
on his promise of guaranty basis that he did
not understand the legal significance of the
document in which he
signed, the concept of objective mutual
assent often preclude such a defense
. . . [T]he present
rules
requires
the
guarantor to read, to inquire as to the facts
which would be apparent to reasonable
persons, and to understand the legal significance of the document which he is signing.
Any mistake which could have been corrected
by due diligence and which is not the
result of imposition practiced
on the
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guarantor by the creditor is not a basis for
rescinding the guaranty contract if the
creditor reasonably relied on the promise of
the guarantor.
38 Am. Jur. 2d Guaranty § 56 (1983).

The Utah Supreme Court in

Utah Valley Bank v. Tanner, 636 P.2d

1060, 1061

(Utah 1981)

stated, "the intent of the parties is to be ascertained from the
content of the instrument itself

..."

The Court in Hotel

Riviera, Inc. v. Torres, 97 Nev. 399, 632

P.2d

1155

(1981),

adopted the following language:
The making of a contract depends not on the
agreement of two minds and one intention, but
on the agreement of two sets of external
signs — not on the parties' having met one
thing but on their having said one thing.
It has been held, "if the signer could read the instrument,
not to have read it is gross negligence; if he could not read
it, not to have it read to him is equally negligent; in either
case, the writing binds him."

Azrak v. Manufacturer's Trust

Company, 120 N.Y.S.2d 855 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953).
Appellant, in its first cause of action

asked the Court to

reform the $371,750.00 Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note to become a
second trust deed for only $25,000.00.

The plaintiff therein

failed to even allege a prima facie case for reformation.
To state a cause of action for reformation, the plaintiff
must at least allege either (1) mutual mistake or (2) "ignorance
or mistake of a complaining party coupled with or induced by the
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fraud or inequitable conduct of the other remaining parties." 66
Am. Jur. 2d Reformation of Instrument,

§ 12

(1973) as quoted

in Thompson v. Smith, 620 P.2d 520, 523 (Utah 1980).
The Cheevers have not alleged any mutual mistake.

There is

no claim that Mr. and Mrs. Seethaler were mistaken as to the
meaning of the documents which were signed.
Cheevers have similarly failed to allege fraud of the type
contemplated by this rule.
would

be

if

An example of this type of fraud

Mr. Seethaler

had

handed

the

Trust

Mr. Cheever and said "this is a $25,000.00 Trust Deed."
is not even an allegation of actionable

Deed

to

There

fraud going to the

signing of the document.
An

allegation

that

Mr. Seethaler

fraudulently

induced

Mr. Cheever to sign the documents by misrepresenting the quality
of the meat packing business, is not a type of fraud which will
support a cause of action for reformation.

The Cheevers have

erroneously urged the Court to rewrite an unambiguous instrument.
In sum, even if Cheever were permitted to bring a separate
action as guarantor, in his allegation of mistake as to the Trust
Deeds, he has wholly failed to establish the sufficient basis for
rescission.
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POINT VII
RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES
BY REASON OF APPELLANTS1 FRIVOLOUS APPEAL.
Pursuant

to

Rule

33

of

the

Utah

Rules

of

Appellate

Procedure, if the Court determines that an appeal taken is
frivolous, it can award just damages of single or double costs,
including reasonable attorney's fees, to the prevailing party.
It is respondent's contention that the appeal undertaken by
the appellants was unnecessary and frivolous.
In appellant's brief, he states that "the case is the most
protracted and ludicrous lawsuit in which there have been at
least three trial settings and the filing of 825 paginated pages
. . ."

(Appellant's Brief Page 4).

The proceeding below was

rather extensive prior to defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
only

because

the

Court

allowed

the plaintiff

to

amend

his

Complaint three times in attempt to state a cause of action, and
because after each hearing the Court allowed the plaintiff to
re-brief the legal questions, and only because the Court thoroughly considered every issue before granting defendant's Motion
for Summary Judgment.
was allowed to
without merit.

Further, the plaintiff, as pointed out,

file enumerable pleadings

all of which were

The last pleading, (March 1985) was to enjoin

the sale of the pledged property.

Their motion was filed in

duplicate in the Supreme Court and the District Court without
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notice of the contemporaneous
Courts

denied

filing to either Court.

the motion, but

the

trial

court

Both

granted

the

defendant $3 00.00 attorney fees for responding to a petition
after the Court had lost jurisdiction and because the prayer for
relief was frivolous.
plaintiffs

are

The same is true of the appeal and the

entitled

to

attorney

fees.

The

Court

below

committed no error of law and after repeated opportunities to
present its case, plaintiff simply failed to state a cause of
action upon which relief could be granted.
CONCLUSION
The Court below allowed the plaintiffs to amend and revise
their Complaint three times in an effort to give them every
opportunity to state a cause of action upon which relief could be
granted.

Upon filing the original Complaint the defendants moved

to dismiss and the Court allowed for briefs and argument.

The

plaintiffs amended their Complaint and the defendants renewed
their Motion to Dismiss.
arguments.

The Court

allowed

for briefs and

The plaintiffs amended their Complaint again and the

defendants moved to dismiss.
dants1 Motion.

This time the Court denied defen-

Subsequently, the defendants moved to dismiss for

plaintiffs1 failure to join a necessary and indispensible party.
The Court allowed for briefs and argument.

After two additional

conferences the Court dismissed the case but allowed the plain39

tiffs to once again amend.

Upon the filing of the plaintiffs1

fourth Complaint, the defendants moved for summary judgment.

The

Court stated its inclination to rule on the Motion in favor of
defendants but once again allowed for briefs and arguments before
entering the ruling.

The Court then ruled

in favor of the

defendants but allowed for additional briefing.

Upon entry of

the ruling, the plaintiff challenged the ruling and Minute Entry
and,

amazingly,

another brief.

the

Court

allowed

plaintiffs

to

submit yet

Finally, the Court ruled against plaintiffs and

granted defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment.
Clearly the trial court went to great lengths to consider
every possible aspect of the litigation and made an enormous
effort to afford plaintiffs every opportunity to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted.
The trial court was correct in ruling that Cheever did not
have a cause of action as guarantor and the statute of limitations had run against the corporations.

The trial court was

further correct in ruling that any alleged fraud was committed
upon both the principal, Utah County Packing and the guarantor,
Cheever and that Utah County Packing affirmed the contract, thus
Cheever was estopped from asserting the alleged fraud, having
elected his remedies.
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The respondents seek affirmation of the trial court's ruling
and seek attorney fees for appellants' frivolous appeal.
DATED this

Z1 "

day of April, 1985.
/

Jft
JACKSON
HOWARD
OWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorney for DefendantsRespondents
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correct copies of the Respondents' Brief was mailed to the
Supreme Court and four true and correct copies of same were
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KENNETH CLARKE
Box H
Provo, UT 84603
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